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SUMMARY OF ARGOMENT
In its brief, the State asserts that some lesser standard
should govern a motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of
its case rather than, as appellant maintains, that the evidence
must be sufficient to sustain a guilty finding beyond a reasonable
doubt.

Further, the State contends that the trial court was not

required to consider the evidence of self-defense introduced in
the State's own case in ruling on the motion for judgment of
acquittal.
As

demonstrated

in

our

initial

brief,

and

as

further

explained below, it is clear that the proper, and only, legal
standard for judging a motion challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence, regardless of when such a motion is made, is whether
there was sufficient evidence from which a trier of fact could
find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
have

a reasonable

doubt

If the trier of fact had to

based on the evidence, the Court is

required to grant the motion.

Most importantly, the question in

this case is whether the trial court's decision on this issue was
against the clear weight of the evidence.

Significantly, the

State does not, and cannot, contend either that it met the legal
standard

articulated

by

appellant

or

that

the

trial

court's

decision, under that standard, was not against the clear weight of
the evidence.

Rather, the State bases its position entirely on

the faulty premise that a "prima facie" case means something less
than evidence sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Under the unusual circumstances of this case,

the motion for judgment of acquittal should have been granted and
the conviction must be reversed.
I.
ARGUMENT
The State Incorrectly and Incompletely Misstates
the Proper Test Governing the Motion for Judgment
of Acquittal Made in This Case.
In an effort to salvage an invalid conviction based on insufficient evidence, the State has misstated and apparently misunderstood the test to be applied in ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal.

The State's error is two-fold.

First, the

State apparently suggests that the "prima facie" test is

some

lesser civil standard which does not require the State to present
sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in order to defeat a motion for judgment of acquittal
in criminal
court,

in

cases. Second, the State contends
ruling

on

a motion

actually permitted to ignore

for

judgment

that the trial

of acquittal, is

evidence of self-defense introduced

by the State in its own case-in-chief.

Indeed, in this case, such

overwhelming evidence was the only evidence of what occurred on
the night in question.

Both propositions are clearly erroneous.

With regard to the first point, the State maintains that the
often-quoted requirement to establish a "prima facie" case at the
close of its case differs quantitatively and legally from the
requirement to present sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at the close of its case.
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See

Brief for Respondent at 16.

Indeed, while the State argues it met

the "prima facie" test, it does not contend that it satisfied the
test set forth by appellant as the correct one.

Appellant submits

that the State distorts the term "prima facie" and, in doing so,
misunderstands the relevant test.
As a threshold matter, it is well-settled that the standard
to be applied in ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal is
the same regardless of when made, i.e., at the close of the government's case, at the close of all the evidence or at the appellate
level in reviewing denial of the motion.

See e.g. , Burks v.

United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1978); United States v. Artuso,
618 F.2d 192 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 1016 (1980); United
States v. Burns, 597 F.2d 939, 941 (5th Cir. 1979).

At all times,

the single standard is whether there was sufficient evidence to
permit a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The fundamental flaw in the State's argument is created by
its misuse of the term "prima facie" without a proper understanding of the context in which it has been used by the courts.
Contrary to the State's astonishing suggestion, reference to the
term "prima facie," in cases such as State v. Romero, 554 P.2d
216, 218 (Utah 1976), does not, and cannot, constitutionally mean
that a lesser civil standard applies to the prosecution's burden
of proof in criminal cases.

Rather, the requirement to establish

a prima facie case means the same in Utah as elsewhere, i.e. the
prosecution

must

present

sufficient
-3-

evidence,

which,

if

un-

challenged and unrebutted, would sustain, although not compel, a
finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt at the close of its
case-in-chief.

See United States v. Coleman, 501 F.2d 342, 345

(10th Cir. 1974); United States v. Taylor, 464 F.2d 240, 243 (2d
Cir. 1972).
If the State does not present sufficient evidence to sustain
a guilty finding beyond a reasonable doubt at the conclusion of
its case, i .e. a prima facie case, then a motion for judgment of
acquittal must be granted.

If, and only if, there is sufficient

evidence at the end of the State's case which, left unrebutted,
would be sufficient to sustain a guilty finding beyond a reasonable doubt should the motion be denied.

If a reasonable doubt

must exist, the motion must be granted.

See United States v.

Taylor, supra, 464 F.2d at 243; State v. Smith, 675 P.2d 521, 524
(Utah 1983).

In the present case, at the close of the State's

case, there was overwhelming

evidence that appellant acted in

self-defense and, in fact, no evidence that appellant did not act
in self-defense.

The trial court, as the trier of fact, therefore

must have had at least a reasonable doubt as to whether Mrs.
Strieby acted in self-defense and its decision on this point was
clearly against the weight of the evidence.

Accordingly, the

motion should have been granted.
The State does not dispute that evidence of self-defense was
introduced in its case-in-chief or that the only evidence of what
happened during the decedent's attack was based on appellant's
-4-

statement to the police which the State chose to introduce in
evidence.

Nor does the State contend that it did, or could, meet

the legal standard advanced

by appellant as the correct test.

Rather, in an effort to circumvent the proper legal standard which
compelled a judgment of acquittal based on insufficient evidence,
the State compounds its earlier analytical error by asserting that
the trial court was free to totally ignore evidence of selfdefense, which the State introduced in its case-in-chief, because
absence of self-defense was not a prima facie element of the crime
charged.
The fact that absence of self-defense was not a prima facie
element of homicide was irrelevant to considering the sufficiency
of the evidence in ruling on the motion for judgment of acquittal.
As the Supreme Court in State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211 (Utah 1985),
noted, once the issue of self-defense is raised "whether by the
defendant's or by the prosecution's evidence," the prosecution has
the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was
not in self-defense.

Id. at 214.

This means that if evidence of

self-defense is introduced during the State's case-in-chief and,
if such evidence precludes a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt at that point, then a motion for judgment of acquittal must
be granted.
Utah's statutory scheme further demonstrates the fallacy of
the State's position and directly supports appellant's position.
In that regard, Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (1978), provides, in
-5-

part,

that

innocent

a

defendant

in

a

criminal

case

is presumed

to be

"until each element of the offense" is proved beyond a

reasonable doubt and, further, it defines the phrase "element of
the offense."

The next statutory provision, Utah Code Ann. y §

76-1-502 (1978), provides, in relevant part:
Section 76-1-501 does not require negating a
defense:
(1) By the allegation in an information,
indictment, or other charge; or
(2) By proof, unless:
(a) The defense is in issue in the
case as a result of evidence presented
at trial, either by the prosecution or
the defense; or . . .
Id.

(emphasis added).

Thus, the fact that the absence of self-

defense is not a prima facie element of the offense simply means
that the State does not need to allege absence of self-defense,
i.e. to expressly

negate the defense, in the information. Utah

Code Ann., § 76-1-502

(1978).

That same statute provides, how-

ever, that the State is required to negate the defense if it is an
issue

in the case

"as a result of evidence presented at trial,

either by the prosecution or the defense."

Id.

In analyzing a

very similar statutory scheme, one Court has noted that the fact
that absence of self-defense is not one of the elements included
in the definition of the offense merely relieves the prosecution
of

the necessity

of pleading

the

absence

of

self-defense

and,

further, relieves "the State of the time-consuming and unnecessary
task of alleging and proving negative propositions which may not
be involved in each case."

State v. McCullum, 656 P.2d 1064, 1070

(Wash. 1983) (en banc).

Once the issue is properly raised in the

State's own case, "the absence of self-defense becomes another
element of the offense which the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt."

![d.

(citations omitted).

In our case, as in

McCullum, self-defense was put at issue by the State in its own
case and it was required, under Knoll and § 76-1-502, to present
sufficient evidence in its case to sustain a finding of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.

It utterly failed to do so.

The trial court was not free, as the State suggests, to
ignore the evidence of self-defense presented by the State in its
own case in considering the motion for judgment of acquittal.

The

fact that the State could not make its case at that point provides
no justification for ignoring the constitutional principles on
which

the

sufficiency

consider all of the

test

is based.

evidence.

The

trial

court must

As demonstrated above, the State's

bald assertion that "the law does not require the State to prove
the absence of self-defense in order to survive a motion for a
directed verdict at the close of the State's case-in-chief" is
flatly incorrect when evidence of self-defense has been introduced
by the State in its own case-in-chief.
must present

sufficient

evidence

In that case, the State

to sustain

a guilty

verdict

beyond a reasonable doubt, including that a defendant did not act
in self-defense.

If the State fails to do so, as in this case,

then a motion for judgment of acquittal must be granted.

Par-

ticularly when judged by the more liberal standard of reversal
-7-

governing bench trials,-

the trial court's conclusion that no

reasonable doubt was required was against the clear weight of the
evidence.

Thus, the motion for judgment of acquittal should have

been granted.
In summary, the State was required at the close of its casein-chief to present sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It failed to do so and the motion
for judgment of acquittal was improperly denied.

II.
The State Largely Ignores the Evidence,
and the Trial Court's Own Conclusions, in
Arguing that the Verdict Was Not Against
the Clear Weight of the Evidence and That a
Definite Mistake was Not Made in the Verdict.
At the close of all the evidence, an acquittal was compelled.
This is especially true since the trial court had "no substantial
reason to doubt Mrs. Strieby's version" and had "no substantial
doubt about the reality of [your] fear, Mrs. Strieby, given the
burly man that your husband was, given his weight and height and

- As this Court knows, when reviewing jury verdicts, great
deference is accorded to the opportunity of twelve individuals to
evaluate the evidence. The test on review is whether there was
any evidence of substance to allow a reasonable person to find
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. That does not mean, of course,
that a finding of guilt must be compelled by the evidence. See
State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 787 n.3 (Utah 1983). In reviewing
a bench trial, little deference is afforded the decision below and
the Court must reverse if the ruling is against the clear weight
of the evidence. Id.
-8-

given his powerful muscular build."

(TR. 321f 323).-

Despite

crediting appellant's version of the facts and the reality of her
fear, the trial court was required to conclude beyond a reasonable
doubt that appellant's real fear was not reasonable in order to
find her guilty.
This Court is free to reject the trial court's conclusion on
this point, as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did in Commonwealth
v. Helm, 402 A.2d 500 (Pa. 1979), a case remarkably similar to
the present one.

In Helm, the appellant, charged with murder of

her boyfriend, was found guilty in a bench trial of manslaughter.
The prosecution's evidence of the event largely consisted of the
appellant's statement.

IcL at 502.

In Helm, like the instant case, the trial court accepted the
appellant's version but found that appellant's fear was not reasonable.

Id. at 503.

Thus, the issue on appeal was whether there

was insufficient evidence to establish her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Specifically, appellant contended that she should

have been acquitted because the evidence raised the self-defense
issue which the prosecution failed to disprove beyond a reasonable
doubt.

Id. at 503.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the conviction and
squarely rejected the trial court's conclusion that appellant's

- Thus, in this case, it was not necessary to discount
questions of credibility and demeanor, since the the trial court
expressly credited appellant's version of the facts. See State v.
Goodman, supra, 763 P.2d at 787.
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fear was not reasonable.

1^3. at 504.

In a portion of its ruling

which is directly on point here, the Supreme Court noted:
The trial court's conclusion that appellant
"could not have believed . . . that it was
necessary to kill in order to save herself
from death or great bodily harm," is not a
finding of fact of the kind that must be
accepted by an appellate court. Although that
conclusion may be considered a factual one, it
is a conclusion which requires that certain
inferences first be drawn from the basic
facts. An appellate court is free to reject
such factual conclusions when they are not
sustained by the underlying facts. . . .
Id. at 504 (citations omitted).-

In Helm, the Court found that

the unarmed decedent's provocation was enough to cause a reasonable belief by appellant that she was in danger of serious bodily
harm or death, noting that

fl

[a]t no time did appellant state that

she did not think herself in danger of serious bodily injury or
death from Harvey's unprovoked attack on her."

Icl. at 504.

This

is exactly like the present case and, in fact, our case is more
compelling for an acquittal than Helm.
fied, and

Dr. Anderson

Here, Mrs. Strieby testi-

confirmed, that as a result of being

knocked down and dragged down the stairs on her back and head, she
was in actual and immediate danger of severe bodily injury or
death given her broken back and four prior back surgeries. Indeed,

— Significantly,
it
appears
from
the
opinion
that
Pennsylvania, unlike Utah, does not have a separate and more
stringent standard of review for bench trials.
Com, v. Helm,
supra, 402 A.2d at 503. Under Utah law, reversal is even more
clearly required in our case.
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Dr. Anderson said that she actually suffered severe bodily injury,
i.e. a ruptured cervical disk. (TR. at 203).
Notwithstanding the uncontradicted testimony of Mrs. Strieby
and Dr. Anderson, the court reached its conclusion based, in large
part, on the theory that the decedent had paused long enough to
fix a drink in the kitchen and, therefore, there was a "reasonable
substantial cessation" in the attack on Mrs. Strieby.

(TR. at 324).

With due respect, the trial court impermissibly dissected the
evidence in reaching this result.

In doing so, its conclusion was

against the clear weight of the evidence.
In order to explain the presence of a blue cup and wet spot
on the stairs, the trial court necessarily concluded beyond a
reasonable doubt that it was logical for the decedent, in the
midst of brutally attacking his wife, to stop and fix a drink in
the kitchen.

Appellant strongly maintains that the trial court

took a speculative leap across a major gap in the evidence.
State v. Harmon, 767 P.2d 567, 568 (Utah App. 1989).
its view, one must

believe beyond

See

To accept

a reasonable doubt that a

drunken, wild man-turned-animal who was pushed into the kitchen
during a heated and relentless attack on his wife stopped at that
point to fix another drink.

By contrast, what is more logical and

probable is that the decedent brought a partially filled cup of
liquor with him from his shop where he had been drinking heavily
all day and that it fell from his hand at some point during the
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attack on his wife on the stairs.-

Certainly, at least a doubt

must exist on this issue.
Moreover, even giving the trial court's speculation on this
point any probative value, it is clear that the decedent immediately resumed his vigorous pursuit of appellant up the steps and
again repeatedly threatened to kill her as he approached her on the
steps.

(TR. at 245-246).

This hardly amounts to any cessation in

hostilities much less a reasonable and substantial cessation in
his attack.

In an effort to support the trial court, the State

has simply lost sight of the fact that the real issue is not, and
never

was, whether

appellant

proved

that

she acted

in self-

defense, but whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt
that she did not act in self-defense.

State v. Knoll, supra.

In that regard, the evidence showed that Mrs. Strieby was not
only in fear of serious bodily injury or death, but, in fact,
suffered

serious bodily

husband that night.

injury

from the brutal

attack

by her

Dr. Mark Anderson testified specifically, in

view of Mrs. Strieby's previously broken back and four prior back
surgeries, that dragging her down the stairs on her back and neck

- This issue never arose during the testimony at trial. In
the motion for a new trial, appellant squarely addressed it by
presenting unrebutted evidence that there was no alcohol in the
house.
The trial court commented at the hearing on the motion
that it did not mean to imply that the decedent necessarily fixed
an alcoholic drink.
(TR. at 354). Appellant submits that the
post-hoc rationalization by the trial court to support its verdict
in the face of appellant's affidavit is even more illogical, i.e. ,
that the drunken decedent would stop to fix a non-alcoholic drink
and carry it up the stairs with him in his continued assault on
his wife.
-12-

caused serious bodily injury and could have easily caused her
death.

(TR. at 203-204).

The clear weight of the evidence at trial established that
Mrs. Strieby shot the decendent in self-defense to protect herself
from serious bodily injury or death.

Even more importantly, there

was simply no evidence, much less evidence to establish beyond a
reasonable doubt, that she did not act in self-defense.
The State also suggests that appellant should have repeatedly
tried

to

leave

the

house

and,

further, that

the

decedent's

drinking had impaired his physical agility to the point where
appellant had been temporarily able to avoid his attack.

Mrs.

Strieby testified, however, that she tried to escape from the
condominium and was unable to do so when the decedent slammed the
door. (TR. at 241).-

Further, the Medical Examiner testified that

the decedent was no more than a wild animal based on his blood
alcohol content. (TR. at 120-121).

The decedent's drunken state

may have saved appellant's life by causing him to strike at her
and miss, but it also made him irrational, wild and unable to stop
pursuing her in his attempt to seriously injure or kill her.
As the testimony

indicates, on other previous occasions,

appellant had been able to stop the decedent from beating her.

- Even though appellant attempted to leave the condominium
and then twice retreated up the stairs in an effort to escape, she
had no duty to retreat under Utah law. See State in Interest of
M. S., 584 P.2d 914, 916 (Utah 1978).
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However, Mrs.
during

the

Strieby

terror

of

recognized

that

the

decedent's

that night were different

and

attacks
that her

husband could not, and would not, stop until he had seriously
injured her or killed her. (TR. at 243-244).

If there was a brief

cessation in hostilities at all (which there was not), the decedent,

because

of

his

irrational

and

drunken

state,

quickly

continued the attack by coming up the stairs and screaming at Mrs.
Strieby that he was going to kill her. (TR. at 245-246).
Appellant had already been dragged down the stairs on her
neck and back causing serious bodily injury.

No civilized society

can require someone in appellant's shoes to become the victim of
violent outrage committed by a wild, muscular man undeniably out
of control.

The law permitted appellant to take reasonable steps

under the then existing circumstances and required the State to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt to the contrary.
Ann.

§ 76-2-402

(1978).

When

all

of

See Utah Code

the circumstances

are

considered, there is no doubt that a serious mistake has been made
and that the court's verdict was against the clear weight of the
evidence.

The State has a solemn duty not just to convict, but to

see

justice

that

is

served.

Justice

reversal of Mrs. Strieby's conviction.
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in this case

requires

CONCLDSION
Appellant's conviction must be reversed, or, in the alternative, the case must be remanded for a new trial.

Further, the

order of restitution should be vacated.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of December, 1989.
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW

Neil A. Kaplan
Anneli R. Smith
Attorneys for Appellant
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